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Gorbachev and the Fall of the USSR |
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Soviet TV, late December 1978: Leonid Brezhnev records New Yeargreetings to Soviet youth: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5j4JepHaP_w |
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Basic methods of social control* authority (the power of command)exchange (the power of deal) persuasion (the power of idea) moral codes (the power of belief) Each political-economic system relies on a specific combination of these methods Under state socialism, the power of command dwarfed all other methods The command economy and one-party rule reinforced each other Extreme centralization of economic and political power Fear of exchange – the specter of capitalist restoration Inefficiency and social discontent *See Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets, Basic Books, 1976 |
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The Communist Party under state socialism The system’s core Theprinciple of hierarchy (“democratic centralism”) The Party leadership controls all mechanisms of the state, including economic management Assuring the mass base through Party membership Control of information (little or no media freedom, heavy use of propaganda, control of the cultural sphere) The key role of security organs Cannot be used against Party leadership Use of force only under extreme circumstances Manipulation of political processes Surveillance, informer networks Preventive measures against dissent |
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The Soviet society: new classes, new expectations, new relations andstructures The ruling class (NOMENKLATURA) Ambivalent social status: the question of ownership Does not need a dictator – WHY? Increasingly confident of its power and right to rule Big, diverse, interested in decentralization – WHY? Reformers, Stalinists, pragmatic conservatives |
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A new society Increasingly urbanized Rapidly growing educationallevels Class struggle is declared over Raised in the spirit of democratic expectations (even if within the limits of official ideology) Demanding higher living standards Women, youth, intellectuals: new social demands Development of nationalist sentiments Citizens losing fear of the state |
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The essence of the reform process States and societies created by thecommunists enter into a process of complex interactions: --between the rulers and the ruled --between different social groups --between internal and external forces Both conflicts and accomodation Challenges to political leaders Open-ended outcomes Successes and failures |
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The main components of the reform process – addressing the system’sflaws DECENTRALIZATION LIBERALIZATION MARKETIZATION DEMILITARIZATION OPENING TO THE WORLD The outcome depended on many factors – both internal and external State socialism had to prove its viability under conditions of peace |
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DecentralizationAchieving rational distribution of power between different levels of communist state structure Within the USSR: More power to national republics Within the Soviet bloc: Loosening of Soviet control over Eastern Europe Limits: Fear of loss of control Requires liberalization The dynamics of nationalism – prospect of creation of new nation-states, shifts of allegiance in the Cold War |
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LiberalizationReducing state domination over society New society expects the state to be democratic – serving the people (influence of ideology – both communist and Western) The international environment fosters those expectations No mass repressions; lesser role for security organs Relaxation of controls over cultural life Development of pluralism within the ruling party How far could communists go down this road? |
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MarketizationRestoration of elements of market systems Considerations of economic efficiency Growing consumer demands Interests of managers, entrepreneurs Problems: Does the revival of market forces make restoration of capitalism inevitable? What do the people want – capitalism or socialism? ALTERNATIVE MODEL – MARKET SOCIALISM |
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DemilitarizationReducing the burden of military expenditures Dismantling the “battle order” (partial) War is not inevitable Counterfactors: Power of the military-industrial complex The international environment (competition with the West, upheavals in the Third World) Persistence of militarized thinking |
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Opening to the WorldWider participation in the global economy Peaceful coexistence with capitalism Arms control and disarmament Wider cultural and human contacts with foreign countries Counterfactors: Moscow feared loss of control over Eastern Europe Dangers of ideological “contamination” International advocacy of human rights challenged communist rulers |
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Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, b. 1931, General Secretary of theCommunist Party of the Soviet Union (1985-1990), President of the USSR (1990-1991) |
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Gorbachev’s wife Raisa (1932-1999) |
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Gorby on need for reform, disarmament http://wwwyoutube.com/watch?v=595W4JJHa2U |
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Time to end the Cold War |
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Negotiating an end to the Cold War The threat of nuclear war as theoverriding issue The Cold War was undermining the Soviet system The economic burden A militarized state ensured bureaucratic paralysis: society lacked basic freedoms, the state was losing its capacity to govern The atmosphere of confrontation with the West was stifling impulses for necessary reforms, imposing ideological rigidity Soviet domination of Eastern Europe was now seen as an obsolete, counterproductive policy. Lessons of Czechoslovakia (1968) and Poland (1980-81). Reforms in Eastern Europe are necessary for Soviet reform. Solution: New Thinking, a plan to negotiate an end to the Cold War to assure security and free up Soviet and East European potential for reform. “The Sinatra Doctrine” |
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Options for reform Conviction that Soviet socialism could only berevived through the creation of a market mechanism and political liberalization (presented as democratization) Linkages between economic and political reforms At first – priority of economic over political Economic reform impossible without political liberalization Political liberalization leads to the emergence of political divisions within the Party and society – rise of pluralism as a natural condition Managing a pluralistic society requires political democracy |
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Novoye myshlenie (new thinking) – reform of the international system,also used to refer to reformist thinking in the USSR Perestroika (restructuring) – a comprehensive overhaul of the Soviet system, involving all areas of public policy Glasnost – a shift to an open information order Demokratizatsiya (democratization) – building a new Soviet political system |
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Which forces supported the reform processThe spectrum inside the Party: from anarchists to monarchists The Party-state bureaucracy – mostly conservative, fearful of change – potential loss of power and privilege The managerial class is interested in greater autonomy, limited market freedom The intellectuals: overwhelming support for liberal reform, democratization Rank-and-file Party membership predominantly in favour of Gorbachev’s reforms The ideological legitimacy of democracy The working class Nationalists in non-Russian republics |
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From reform to collapse 1. 1985-86: negotiating an end to the Cold WarCautious attempts at reforms, with the main emphasis on the economy 2. 1986-88: End of the Cold War. A more decisive policy of market reforms, accompanied by glasnost, liberalization, and political reform 3. 1989: First democratic election in USSR, emergence of democratic opposition, fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe 4. 1990: Democratic elections in the 15 Soviet republics, push for sovereignty, Gorbachev’s desperate attempts to maintain control 5. 1991: Escalation of conflict between conservatives and democratic reformers. The August coup and the paralysis of the Soviet state. Dissolution of the Soviet Union. |
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November 1989: the fall of the Berlin Wall, symbol of Cold Wardivision of Europe |
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Moscow, August 1991: hard-liners attempt a coup to stop democraticreforms |
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Leaders of the August 1991 coup present themselves at a Moscowpress-conference |
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August, 1991: Barricades in front of the Russian Parliament building |
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The August 1991 coup: http://wwwyoutube.com/watch?v=-4bWo49OoFo |
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The military desert the coup and join protesters |
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Russians celebrating the defeat of the August coup |
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Freed from house arrest in Crimea, Gorbachev returns to Moscow |
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After the coup, Gorbachev was rapidly losing power to Boris Yeltsin |
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December 1991: the three men who dissolved the Soviet Union, left toright: Presidents Kravchuk of Ukraine, Shushkevich of Belarus, Yeltsin of Russia |
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FACTS BEHIND THE DRAMA THE SOVIET EMPIRE WAS DISSOLVED IN A SERIES OFPOLITICAL DEALS, INITIATED BY MOSCOW ROUND ONE: Gorbachev encourages East European communists to act on their own; USSR loses control over Eastern Europe; Soviet republics get more power ROUND TWO: Yeltsin and leaders of the other 14 republics move to dissolve the USSR ROUND THREE: Yeltsin and leaders of Russia’s regions sign the Federal Treaty to establish the Russian Federation |
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THE BIG DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO FALLS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE IN THE20TH CENTURY: The Romanov Empire collapsed as a result of a revolution, the elites were overthrown and replaced by new elites as a result of the civil war The Communist elites moved to divide the empire to recast themselves as leaders of independent nation-states – or of units of the Russian Federation A key reason why the Soviet empire made a relatively quiet exit was because key Soviet elites saw a future for themselves after communism |
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Gorbachev in Toronto, March 2005 |
«Gorbachev and the Fall of the USSR» |
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